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Introduction 
There is a long historical tradition of trying to understand morality in terms of a contract. The 
core idea in this tradition is that what is right and wrong is in some way grounded in either 
what we have agreed to do or in what we could be expected to agree to in some hypothetical 
circumstances. This contractualist way of thinking goes back to at least Ancient Greece (Plato, 
The Republic, 358e–359b), but it really became the prominent way of thinking especially about 
our political obligations during the Early Modern period through the social contract theories of 
Thomas Hobbes (1996 [1651]), John Locke (2002 [1689]), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1997 
[1762]).  
 
Contractualism is not, however, merely a historical tradition, but rather it continues to be a 
popular approach. In political philosophy, many debates concerning justice still tend to take 
John Rawls’s (1971) contractualism as their starting point. Similarly, in moral philosophy, 
different ways of developing the basic contractualist insights are at the centre of several key 
theoretical debates (Gauthier 1986, Scanlon 1998, Southwood 2010, and Parfit 2011). That so 
many people have approached morality through the idea of a contract for over two millennia 
suggests that the contractualist framework must be getting something right. Yet, as we will see 
below, the devil will be in the details. 
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For the sake of simplicity, this chapter focuses on just one contemporary formulation of 
contractualism – the version outlined by T.M. Scanlon in his 1998 book What We Owe to Each 
Other. This view is often considered to be the paradigmatic version of contractualism – a 
pinnacle in the long tradition of contractualist thinking. It’s also one of the clearest, most 
appealing, and most debated formulations of contractualism. 
 
The next section provides an outline of Scanlon’s theory. The following section then explains 
how contractualism differs from classical utilitarianism especially in its treatment of cases that 
involve different sized groups. After this, I will outline a key internal debate in contractualist 
ethics today to do with how the view should be formulated with respect to time. Finally, the 
last section focuses on two traditional objections to contractualism – the redundancy objection 
and the question of whether the view can explain our obligations towards non-human animals 
and cognitively impaired human beings. 
 
Outline of Scanlon’s Contractualism 
According to Scanlon (1998, 147–153), ethical theories must be able to answer the following 
two questions: 
1. Which actions are right and wrong? 
2. What good reasons do we have for not doing the actions that are wrong? 
When it comes to the first question, we are looking for a theory of right and wrong that would 
fit our carefully considered moral convictions about individual cases (Scanlon 2003, 149). 
Thus, a theory that entails that we should keep our promises and not be rude to our friends will 
be much more plausible in this respect than a theory that entails that it would be morally 
permissible to harm innocent babies for fun.  
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In the case of the second question, Scanlon emphasizes that a plausible ethical theory should 
be able to answer that question in an informative way (Scanlon 1998, §4,3; Prichard 1912). For 
this reason, a theory that claims that we should do right actions merely because they are right 
will be less plausible. In addition, if a theory claims that we should avoid doing wrong actions 
because acting in those ways will make us worse off (due to, for example, the disapproval of 
others), that theory too fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the second question. The reason 
offered here is a wrong kind of a reason – not a moral reason but rather one based on selfishness. 
We expect, after all, that good moral agents do what is right for some other reason than merely 
their own selfish interests. 
 
Let us then consider how Scanlon’s contractualism tries to answer the previous two questions. 
At the heart of his view is the following principle (Scanlon 1998, 153): 
 
An action is wrong if and only if it is forbidden by the set of principles no one could 
reasonably reject (and right if it is authorized by those principles). 
 
Notice that the view is not formulated in terms of which principles individuals actually agree 
to accept or could accept. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is questionable whether 
there ever is or could be principles that everyone would accept at the same time – there just 
seems to exist too much moral disagreement for that to be possible. Secondly, Scanlon (1998, 
155) worries that some self-sacrificing individuals will agree to principles that would be very 
bad for them, because those principles benefit others. If we understood right and wrong in 




So, instead of an actual agreement, Scanlon formulates his view in terms of principles no one 
could reasonably reject. What are they then? Scanlon (1998, 195) thinks that we should first 
consider what would be the consequences of adopting together different sets of moral 
principles. Different principles would, of course, make a difference to what kind of lives 
different individuals would come to live. We can then call the lives that individuals would 
come to live under the different principles their “standpoints” (Scanlon 1998, §5.4). Here some 
elements of those standpoints will be good and make the lives choice-worthy, whereas other 
elements will be different burdens the individuals occupying those standpoints will have to 
bear as a result of the moral principles they live under.  
 
Scanlon (1998, §5.2) then claims that individuals can make objections to the principles we 
could adopt together on the basis of the personal burdens they would have to bear under them. 
What are these burdens? Scanlon (1998, 204) suggests that we cannot understand them on the 
basis of people’s personal tastes or specific interests but rather we need to focus on what 
“generic reasons” individuals would have for objecting to the principles on the basis of their 
own personal standpoints. For example, we can ask whether the principles entail that 
individuals would be physically harmed, unable to trust other people or to form personal 
relationships with them, suffer from poverty or ill health, unable to be autonomous or to make 
free choices, have limited opportunities to engage with education, art, sciences, and so on. 
 
Scanlon’s (1998, 195) contractualism then focuses on the individuals who can make the 
strongest personal objections to the principles they live under based on the burdensome 
elements of their personal standpoints. Those individuals can reasonably reject a set of moral 
principles they live under if there is an alternative set to which no one has an equally serious 
personal objection. The set of principles no one can reasonably reject is then the one where 
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some individuals have stronger personal objections to all other sets (ibid.). According to this 
view, the actions that are authorized by that non-rejectable set are then the morally right things 
to do for us whereas the actions that are forbidden by it are wrong. This is Scanlon’s answer to 
the first question above. I’ll use a concrete example in the next section to illustrate how the 
previous test works in practise, and the later sections will also consider how well the view fits 
our moral intuitions. Before that, let me introduce Scanlon’s answer to the second question. 
 
Why should we then follow the non-rejectable principles? The key claim here is that by doing 
so you can justify your actions to others on defensible grounds (Scanlon 1998, §4,3). In 
contrast, if you do not follow these principles, you are telling other people that you are willing 
to overlook their serious objections to your way of treating them. This is because, by violating 
the non-rejectable principles, you are expressing to others that you would rather follow some 
other principles that cause wholly unnecessary serious burdens to some individuals, burdens 
which no one would need to bear if you followed the non-rejectable principles. Furthermore, 
those who will be the victims of your unjustifiable actions will take the fact that you don’t care 
about their objections to indicate that you are not willing to grant them the same equal moral 
status as for others and this they will see as a serious moral harm done to them. In Philip Pettit’s 
words, for this reason we tend to “shrink from the gaze of another when we realise that it is 
impossible for us to justify our behaviour to someone else” (Pettit, 2000, 231). 
 
On the positive side, if you follow the non-rejectable principles and thus show that you care 
about whether you can justify your actions to others on grounds no one could reasonably reject, 
this will allow you to form valuable moral relationships with others – the kind of relationships 
we have good reasons to be in for its own sake. Scanlon (1998, 162) calls these relationships 
ones characterized by “mutual recognition”. In them, we can wholeheartedly stand by our 
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actions knowing that no one could reasonably reject the principles we act on. Generally, this 
will also lead to an atmosphere of trust and mutual co-operation, which will also be in our 
interests in other ways too. Thus, to summarize, in this way Scanlon believes that there is a 
close connection between (i) his account of right and wrong in terms of the principles no one 
could reasonably reject and (ii) his story of why we ought to avoid acting wrongly based on 
the valuable moral relationships avoiding those actions will enable us to have. 
 
Contractualism, Utilitarianism, and Aggregation 
To see how the previous view works, let us consider an example Scanlon (1998, 235) uses both 
to illustrate the view and to compare it to classical utilitarianism. According to classical 
utilitarianism, an action is right if and only if it would lead to a higher total amount of general 
happiness than any other alternative available to you in the situation you are in. Consider then 
the following case. 
 
It’s the World Cup final – a match watched by millions of people. Unfortunately, there is an 
accident at the transmitter room and some crucial electronic equipment has fallen on Jones’s 
arm. This is giving him extremely painful electric shocks but the only way to save Jones would 
be to cut off the transmission for fifteen minutes. The problem is that doing so would deny 
millions of people the enjoyment of watching the match for that time. What is the right thing 
to do? 
 
Classical utilitarianism’s answer to this question is that we should continue the transmission 
despite the suffering this would cause to Jones. After all, if we cut the transmission, we will 
lose millions of fifteen-minute-long periods of enjoyment added together, and this would be a 
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worse loss in terms of the total amount of happiness than if Jones has to suffer for the rest of 
the match.  
 
Scanlon’s (1998, 235) contractualism, in contrast, entails that we should stop the transmission 
and save Jones. It makes us focus on the most serious objections that individuals would have 
to different solutions to the dilemma. If we continue the transmission, Jones will have a very 
strong objection to this based on the extremely painful electric shocks. Yet, if we stop the 
transmission, the strongest objection any one individual will have to this will be the loss of 
fifteen minutes of enjoyment. If we compare these two personal objections pairwise, it is 
evident that Jones’s objection is stronger. This is why, on Scanlon’s view, Jones can reasonably 
reject the principles that would authorize continuing the transmission whereas no one can 
reasonably reject the principles that require us to save him.  
 
Most people here share the intuition that saving Jones would be the right thing to do. 
Consequentialist views, such as classical utilitarianism, that allow us to aggregate the minor 
benefits of many people together appear to let us sacrifice few individuals for the sake of the 
common good. They allow using minorities as a means to the happiness of the majority in a 
way that we tend to find objectionable. One motivation for Scanlon’s (1998, 234–235) 
contractualism thus is that it offers individuals “anti-utilitarian” moral protections due to the 
“individualist restriction” built into it. This is the core idea that we can compare only the 
personal burdens and objections to different principles and never aggregate them together. 
 
This important motivation for contractualism, unfortunately, also seems to lead to problems in 
the cases in which aggregating the objections seems quite appealing. For example, consider a 
case where you can save either one person from a certain death or a large group of people from 
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something almost as bad, for example from permanent blindness or paralysis (Scanlon 1998, 
§5.9). In this case, no matter how large the group (say, millions), Scanlon’s view seems to 
entail that we still ought to save the one individual from the slightly more serious harm. This 
is because her personal objection (death) to not saving her will be stronger than the personal 
objections the individual members of the large group (blindness or paralysis) have to saving 
the one individual and we are not allowed to add those objections together. As a result, 
Scanlon’s contractualism appears to require us to save always the one individual from a serious 
harm rather than a very large group from a slightly less serious harm. 
 
Scanlon (1998, §5.9) tried to address this concern already in What We Owe to Each Other. 
Firstly, he suggested that different harms belong to “broad categories of moral seriousness” 
(Scanlon 1998, 238). This allows us to think that harms that are almost as serious really belong 
to the same category and so they can be treated as comparable to one another. Thus, in the 
previous example, blindness and paralysis would belong to the same category as death. Scanlon 
(1998, 232) also suggested that, even if we are not allowed to aggregate the objections of 
different individuals together, we should still always save the larger group in the cases where 
the harms on both sides belong to the same category of seriousness. This is because, if the 
larger group is not saved in those cases, each member of that group can object not only to the 
harm they would suffer but also for the unfairness of the fact that their additional presence in 
the larger group is not making any difference to what we are to do in the case. Scanlon then 
suggests that this additional consideration counts as a tiebreaker when we must choose between 
saving a smaller group and saving a larger group where the personal objections on both sides 
are roughly equally strong. Whether these responses work continues to be debated intensively. 
 
Ex-Post versus Ex-Ante Contractualism 
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This section introduces a more recent lively debate about how Scanlon’s contractualism should 
be formulated with respect to from which temporal perspective we should consider the personal 
objections to different moral principles. The way I formulated Scanlon’s contractualism above 
is today known as ex-post contractualism (“ex-post” is Latin and means “after the fact”). 
According to this type of contractualist views, when we compare different moral principles, 
we focus on what we can predict would actually happen to specific individuals as a result of 
the adoption of those principles. Here we are imagining a process where the moral principles 
are first adopted by everyone and then, because of this, different things happen to different 
individuals. After all of this has happened in the imagined process, we then retrospectively 
collect information about what happened to different individuals and how those individuals can 
now object to the principles they have lived under. Because of this temporal perspective of 
looking backwards, one thing that we will not take into account is how likely it was that any 
one individual had to bear the burdens he or she came to bear. 
 
The other alternative is ex-ante contractualism (“ex-ante” means “before the event”). 
According to such theories, we are to consider objections which individuals would have to the 
adoption of different principles from a temporally antecedent perspective, from before those 
principles are adopted. From that perspective, individuals cannot object to the principles based 
on what actually happens to them as a result of their adoption. Such consequences, after all, 
haven’t been produced yet by the principles, and it might be uncertain and unpredictable how 
different individuals will be affected. Because of this, from the temporally antecedent 
perspective individuals can object to the principles only based on what kind of prospects the 
principles give to them. This means that individuals can object to the principles based on 
different potential burdens the principles might produce, but importantly these objections must 
be discounted by how improbable the relevant burdens are.  
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In this framework, everyone can thus object to the principles based on the risks the principles 
impose on them. These risks can be understood more technically in terms of what is called an 
individual’s “burdensomeness expectation” for a given set of principles. To get that 
expectation, an individual can multiply each personal burden a given principle could produce 
with its probability and then these products are summed up. The thought then is that the non-
rejectable set of principles is such that all other principles create higher burdensomeness 
expectations for some individuals.  
 
To see what these two alternatives mean in practice, let us consider two examples – one which 
supports the ex-post views and another which supports the ex-ante views. The first example is 
Scanlon’s (1998, 208–209) own original reason for formulating his view in the ex-post way. 
Consider a health-care policy that would require “us to impose very severe hardship on a tiny 
minority of people, chosen at random (by making them involuntary subjects of painful and 
dangerous medical experiments, for example), in order to benefit a much larger majority” 
(Scanlon 1998, 208). According to ex-post contractualism, this policy is clearly reasonably 
rejectable. We know that, when we adopt the principle, there will be some individuals who will 
be coercively subjected to painful medical experiments. After the principle has been adopted, 
these individuals can reasonably reject the principle given that there are alternative principles 
under which no one has to bear equally serious burdens. This is why the ex-post views get this 
case intuitively right.  
 
In contrast, the ex-ante views seem objectionable here because the policy’s burdensomeness 
expectation for each individual will actually be quite good from the temporally antecedent 
perspective. For any individual, the policy has two possible outcomes: the very likely outcome 
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that you will benefit from the policy and the very unlikely outcome that you will have to suffer 
due to the painful medical experiments. If we assign the positive outcome for you the value of 
100 and a probability of 0.999 and the bad outcome for you the value of -1000 and the 
probability of 0.001, then the policy’s burdensomeness expectation for you would be (100 x 
0.999) + (-1000 x 0.001) = 99.9 + -1 = 98.9. This could well be a better expectation for you 
than if the policy were not adopted. For this reason, the ex-ante versions seem to support 
objectionable policies that will in the future sacrifice some random individuals for the sake of 
minor benefits for everyone else. 
 
There are, however, also cases where the ex-ante views work better. Consider the case of social 
risk imposition first described by Johann Frick (2015, 181). In it, a terrible virus will kill one 
million young children if we do nothing. Fortunately, there are two vaccines we could produce 
(even if we cannot produce both). Vaccine 1 will save every child from death, but it does not 
offer complete protection. Every child is still certain to get one of their legs paralyzed. In 
contrast, the Vaccine 2 gives every child a 0.999 chance of surviving the virus completely 
unharmed. This means that every child has a 0.001 chance that the Vaccine 2 they take does 
not work for them in which case the child will sadly die. Furthermore, whichever of these two 
vaccines we produce, that vaccine will then be given to all the one million children. Which of 
the vaccines should we then produce? 
 
Here the ex-post views have implausible consequences. According to them, we should produce 
the Vaccine 1 even if we know that the consequence of this policy will be that every one of the 
million young children will have a paralyzed leg. This is because the ex-post views direct us to 
compare the most serious personal objections the children will eventually have because of the 
adoption of the two different policies. In the scenario where we produce the Vaccine 1, the 
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strongest objection any one child has to this policy will be that one of their legs gets paralyzed 
for the rest of their life. In contrast, in the scenario in which we produce the Vaccine 2, the 
strongest personal objections few children will have to this policy will be that because of the 
policy they die very young. Because these latter personal objections to the production of the 
Vaccine 2 are stronger, the principle that we ought to produce the Vaccine 1 cannot be 
reasonably rejected. This is why the ex-post views entail that producing the Vaccine 1 is the 
right thing to do, but this is intuitively wrong.  
 
In contrast, from the temporally antecedent perspective, it seems like for every individual child 
the policy that requires producing the Vaccine 2 will offer them better prospects. From this 
perspective, each child will compare the certainty of having one of their legs paralyzed to 
getting a 0.999 chance of surviving unharmed and a 0.001 chance of dying. Here most of us 
would rather take the second option as it seems to us that it is worthwhile to take the small 
chance of dying in order to escape the certainty of getting one of your legs paralyzed. This is 
why according to the ex-ante views the policy that requires producing the Vaccine 2 cannot be 
reasonably rejected, which intuitively seems to get things right.  
 
Interestingly, we then have one case that supports the ex-post views and one that supports the 
ex-ante versions even if both views cannot be true. As a result of this stand-off, the defenders 
of the ex-ante views have tried to develop their views further so as to find a version that would 
not entail that we should adopt the policy that permits subjecting some individuals to painful 
medical experiments in the first case. Likewise, the defenders of the ex-post views have tried 
to develop their views further so as to avoid the objectionable consequence that we should 
produce the Vaccine 1 in the second case. At this point, it still seems an open question which 
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of these versions of contractualism will turn out to best fit all our carefully considered moral 
convictions about different cases. 
 
 
Objections to Contractualism 
This final section will finally consider two common objections to contractualism. According 
to the first and the most frequent one, contractualism is theoretically redundant – a spare wheel 
in the machine of ethical theorizing that does no genuine work but rather merely whizzes 
around. According to the second objection, contractualism fails because it cannot ground our 
obligations to treat non-human animals and cognitively impaired human beings well. 
 
The basic assumption of the first traditional objection is that, as an ethical theory, 
contractualism is an attempt to explain something important about right and wrong actions – 
be this (i) which actions are right and wrong, (ii) what makes those actions right and wrong, or 
(iii) what it is for them to be right and wrong. At least three reasons have then been given for 
why the contractualist explanations for these things would be bad explanations (Southwood 
2009, §3.5). 
 
Firstly, it has been argued that there are always better explanations available (McGinn 1999, 
35–36). For example, what explains why harming an innocent baby for fun is wrong must be 
how much the baby would suffer and how monstrous the action would be. This seems like a 
much better explanation than the one based on the idea that the potential baby-torturer could 
not justify his or her actions to others on grounds no one could reasonably reject. 
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Secondly, it has also been argued that the contractualist explanation would be circular – it is 
presupposing things that it is supposed to try to explain (Hooker 2000). For example, it could 
be claimed that, when we consider the different objections individuals can make to different 
principles, at this point we smuggle in prior features of morality (that is, objections already 
based on what is right and wrong) that are not validated by the contractualist theory. 
 
Finally, the most common version of the objection is that the contractualist explanations are 
redundant (Blackburn 1999). Whenever someone can reasonably reject a principle allowing 
some action, for example, because of the harm that those kinds of actions cause to them, that 
relevant harm itself seems enough to explain the wrongness of the actions in question. Going 
in the explanation first from the harms to reasonable rejection and then from reasonable 
rejection to wrongness is just an unnecessary detour where the middle stage can be cut off 
without a loss.  
 
Contractualists have, of course, tried to address these concerns. The main line of response is 
based on the thought that contractualism is needed to do genuine explanatory work to get us 
from other people’s potential personal objections to your actions to the reasons you personally 
have for acting in certain ways (Ridge 2001). For example, in the social risk imposition case 
described above, the theory is needed to explain how we get from what different objections 
each child would have for producing either the Vaccine 1 or the Vaccine 2 to the conclusion 
that you have most reason to produce the Vaccine 2, as that is not obvious before we compare 
the different objections the children have. Whether this line of response works is something 
that continues to divide opinions. 
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The second common objection concerns our duties towards non-human animals and 
cognitively limited human beings such as infants or severely disabled individuals (Phillips 
1998; Hooker 2000, §2.9; Nussbaum 2006). The problem is that Scanlon’s contractualism 
understands right and wrong in terms of the reasons individuals have for objecting to different 
principles. Yet, having a reason to make an objection seems to require (i) being able to evaluate 
how strong reasons different considerations provide for you to make objections, and (ii) being 
able to make the objection in question. These things, however, are something that non-human 
animals and cognitive limited human beings cannot do. For this reason, both groups do not 
seem to have any reasons to object to the principles that would permit mistreating them, and 
so contractualism seems unable to explain our obligations towards non-human animals and 
cognitively limited human beings.  
 
Several contractualist responses to this objection have been offered, but these responses remain 
controversial too. Firstly, it could be suggested that many of us who can evaluate and make 
objections deeply care about non-human animals and cognitively impaired human beings, and 
so at least we have reasons to reject the principles that permit mistreating them. The problem 
is that this response only gives non-human animals and cognitively limited human beings an 
objectionably indirect moral status – they would only matter morally because they happen to 
matter to us (Hooker 2000, 68). It has also been suggested that we can imagine that non-human 
animals and cognitively limited human beings would have trustees, who could then reasonably 
reject principles on their behalf (Scanlon 1998, §4.8). It has likewise been thought that 
contractualism is only attempting to capture a core part of interpersonal morality – what we 
owe to each other – and so it is not surprise that some other theory is required to explain the 




This chapter has then tried to introduce contractualism in a positive light. Whilst doing so, it 
has also tried to be open about the main problems of the theory. The first section explained 
how, according to contractualism, what is right and wrong is determined by the principles no 
one could reasonably reject, where these principles are a function of the personal objections 
individuals can make to different alternatives. This section also introduced how, according to 
Scanlon, we ought to follow the non-rejectable principles because of the valuable personal 
relationships this enables us to form with others. 
 
The second section then used the television transmitter case to illustrate how contractualism 
differs from classical utilitarianism. After this, I explained how there are two different versions 
of contractualism depending on from which temporal perspective we consider the relevant 
objections. Finally, the last section introduced the redundancy objection and the challenges 
contractualists face when they try to explain our obligations towards non-human animals and 
cognitively impaired human beings. I can only hope that this brief introduction inspires a new 
generation of ethicists to explore the contractualist tradition further. 
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